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In the decade of the 1980s, Cuba has confronted a 
worsening debt problem in terms of convertible cur-
rency and in the context of its participation in the 
world economy. Before 1985, the debt problem 
appeared to be manageable, indeed it did not seem to 
be seriously damaging to Cuba's macroeconomic 
growth performance, which was strong from 1981 to 
1985 in contrast to most other developing country 
debtors, which underwent profound economic con-
traction in this period. 
By 1986, however, the convertible currency debt 
problem appeared to have entered a new phase. It 
became clear in that year that Cuba could no longer 
avoid austerity and economic contraction as a result 
of, and requirement for, dealing with the debt. In 
retrospect, it appears that the real severity of the 
debt problem had been obscured and avoided from 
1980-1985 by temporary factors which strengthened 
the balance of trade situation. With the weakening of 
these factors in 1986, the genuine character of the 
debt problem became apparent. 
In this study the origins, dimensions and 
impacts of the debt problem are examined first. The 
debt renegotiations, and particularly those of 1986-
1988, are then analysed in the context of the macro-
economic and external situation at the time. Cuba's 
policy response to the 1986-1988 crisis is examined, 
and finally the situation in 1988 is outlined and the 
policy options are assessed. 
•Department of Economics and School of Interna-
tional Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. 
Introduction 
In the decade of the 1980s, Cuba has confronted a 
worsening debt problem in terms of convertible 
currency and in the context of its participation in 
the world economy outside the Council of Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA) grouping. 
This convertible currency debt grew rapidly in 
the 1970s for a variety of reasons but it was not 
until the 1980s that it began to create serious 
difficulties for Cuba. In the first half of the 1980s, 
the debt was of continuous concern and required 
rescheduling three times. Before 1985, the debt 
problem appeared to be manageable. Indeed, it 
did not seem to be seriously damaging to Cuba's 
macroeconomic growth performance, which was 
strong from 1981 to 1985 in contrast to most 
other developing country debtors, which under-
went profound economic contraction in this 
period. 
By 1986, however, the convertible currency 
debt problem appeared to have entered a new 
phase. Despite previous reschedulings, a deteri-
orating balance-of-payments situation made ser-
vicing the debt difficult in 1986, so that a fourth 
round of negotiations was initiated by Cuba in 
that year. Cuba suspended payment on the debt 
on 1 July 1986 pending successful completion of 
the negotiations. At the same time, it became 
clear that Cuba could no longer avoid austerity 
and economic contraction as a result of, and 
requirement for, dealing with the debt. In retro-
spect, it appears that the real severity of the debt 
problem had been obscured and avoided from 
1980-1985 by temporary, reversible, and some-
what unnatural factors which strengthened the 
balance of trade situation. With the weakening 
of these factors in 1986, the genuine character of 
the debt problem became apparent. By 1987, the 
magnitude of the convertible currency debt was 
approximately US$5.6 billion out of a total debt 
of about US$13.8 billion. 
The objective of this essay is to describe and 
analyse Cuba's convertible currency debt prob-
lem in the 1980s, with special emphasis on the 
1986-1988 period. The origins, dimensions and 
impacts of the debt problem are examined first. 
The debt renegotiations, and particularly those 
of 1986-1988, are then analysed in the context of 
the macroeconomic and external situation at the 
time. Cuba's policy response to the 1986-1988 
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crisis is examined. Finally the situation in early 
1988 is outlined and the policy options are 
assessed. 
Before proceeding with the central part of 
this analysis, some preliminary comments are 
required on the dual character of Cuba's partici-
pation in the international economy, in order to 
explain why a distinction is drawn in balance of 
payments and debt accounting practices between 
its relations with the CMEA grouping in non-
convertible currencies, and those conducted in 
convertible currencies with the rest of the world. 
Cuba's explanation of the apparent paradox con-
cerning its commitment to honour its own for-
eign debts while advocating a repudiation of the 
debts incurred by other countries of Latin Amer-
ica and the rest of the Third World is also sum-
marized in this introduction. 
Cuba keeps two sets of balance of payments 
accounts and two sets of debt statements. One set 
is in convertible currencies and includes trade 
and financial interactions with non-CMEA coun-
tries and any trade conducted in such hard cur-
rencies with CMEA countries. Some socialist 
countries, such as China and Yugoslavia, are 
treated for accounting purposes as being largely 
or partly in the convertible currency area, but 
counter-trade arrangements with non-CMEA 
countries (e.g., Spain) are also included within 
the convertible currency area. By 1986,15.3% of 
Cuba's total trade was in convertible currencies 
and 13-8% was with the market economies (so 
that the correspondence between these two was 
high but not complete). These proportions 
represented substantial declines during the 
1980s in trade in convertible currencies and with 
market economies, which were in the regions of 
24-25% and 22-25% respectively in 1980-1981 
(see table 7 below and Comité Estatal de Esta-
dísticas (CEE) 1985, table XI.7). 
The keeping of two sets of accounts reflects 
the dual character of Cuba's international eco-
nomic relations. Cuba's trade and financial rela-
tions with the CMEA grouping are conducted 
largely in non-convertible currencies, although 
there are mechanisms for clearing payments 
imbalances among countries within the group-
ing. The pricing of major commodities and 
manufactures exchanged in the CMEA is usually 
not based on or linked closely to world price 
levels. 
Moreover, the terms and conditions of 
Cuba's convertible currency debt differ sharply 
from those for its debt with the USSR and other 
East European countries. Whereas the various 
forms of convertible currency loans were 
obtained on the commercial terms and condi-
tions prevailing in the developed market econo-
mies, the terms of lending from the USSR have 
been particularly lenient. Commercial credits 
from the USSR bear a 4% rate of interest with a 
12-year amortization, while the terms for finan-
cial credits are 2% and 25 years. Repayment of 
both types of loans can be in goods and services, 
and has been highly postponable in practice 
(Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC) 1982, p. 15; 
Rodriguez, 1986a, p. 57). (Repayment of Soviet 
loans has in fact been postponed on a number of 
occasions, and now is to begin in 1990.) These 
differences in lending practices and terms con-
stitute a further reason for treating the CMEA 
debt and the convertible currency debt 
separately. 
For purposes of dealing with its creditors 
(including banks, governments and enterprises) 
in the convertible currency area, Cuba has made 
public its convertible currency debt situation 
since the early 1980s. On the other hand, the 
debt situation with the Soviet Union and the 
other CMEA countries is "classified" informa-
tion. Cuba has argued that this information is in 
any case of no concern to the international finan-
cial community of the non-CMEA world in anal-
ysing and renegotiating the country's 
convertible currency debt. For this reason, 
Cuba's convertible currency debt situation can be 
analysed in detail on the basis of publicly-
available information, whereas the debt situa-
tion with the CMEA countries can only be the 
subject of estimation and speculation at this 
time, due to the policy of official secrecy concern-
ing it. 
Finally, a few words are appropriate on the 
apparent contradiction of advocating debt repu-
diation for the rest of Latin America while 
emphasizing Cuba's willingness to pay its own 
debt. As is well known, President Castro has 
been a frequent and vociferous advocate of debt 
repudiation by Third World countries, particu-
larly from 1984 to 1986 (Castro, 1985a; 1985b; 
1987). At the same time, he has emphasized 
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Cuba's commitment to fulfill its financial obliga-
tions and repay its debt: "...we are the only ones 
(in Latin America) who can pay the debt and 
who want to pay the debt, who have the will and 
the possibility..." (cited in Rodriguez, 1986a, 
p. 54) (see also Castro, 1987, pp. 144-150; BNC, 
1986a, p. 19). This paradox has been seen out-
side Cuba as a policy contradiction, or perhaps 
even as a form of official hypocrisy. (See, for 
example, the Wall Street Journal, May 30,1985; 
New York Times, July 28, 1985.) However, the 
Cubans consider that the character of Cuba's 
borrowing is different from that of the rest of 
Latin America (Castro, 1987, pp. 147-148). 
Cuba's borrowing, it is claimed, was not from 
commercial banks in the United States, but 
"with banks which challenged U.S. pressures, 
and included other credit sources from develop-
ing countries". Moreover, Castro has emphas-
ized that Cuba's credits were invested in 
productive development projects or in social 
programme and were not misspent, nor did they 
permit capital flight on the part of local élites 
(Castro, 1987, p. 148). For these reasons, Presi-
dent Castro has stated that "we have always 
Cuba's convertible currency debt was small at the 
beginning of the 1970s, amounting to Cu$291 
million in 1969. It grew rapidly from 1969 to 
1979, however, at a compound average rate of 
27.4% per annum, to reach a level of Cu$3 267.3 
million in 1979 (see table 1). Although precise 
information for the 1970s on debt service and 
convertible currency foreign exchange earnings 
(which differed somewhat from foreign 
exchange earnings with the market economies) 
is not available, there was no serious problem 
with debt service. When sugar prices declined 
from their 1974-1975 highs to lower levels from 
1977-1979, however, debt service became some-
what more onerous. Nevertheless, even though 
the debt situation was attracting some attention 
proposed to fulfill our (debt) obligations to the 
extent it is possible to do so" (Castro, 1987, 
p. 147). At the same time, and despite the fact 
that Cuba faces terms and conditions on its con-
vertible currency debt similar to those facing 
other Latin American debtor countries, Presi-
dent Castro argued that Cuba had a moral obliga-
tion to speak out on behalf of the other Latin 
American debtor countries, advocating a form of 
debt forgiveness or repudiation. This obligation 
existed because —at least until 1986— Cuba's 
growth performance was strong in contrast to 
the situation in the rest of Latin America (see 
table 7 for relative growth performances). 
Cuba's economy was strong, in Castro's view, 
because of its integration within the CMEA sys-
tem and the favourable trade and financial envi-
ronment which the socialist bloc provided (and 
which President Castro characterized as a type of 
new international economic order) (Castro 
1985a, p. 168). It would have been difficult to 
convince President Castro in 1985 that there was 
a problem with respect to his country's converti-
ble currency debt. This situation has probably 
changed in the 1986-1988 period, however. 
in this period (see, for example, Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1977-1979) foreign 
bankers and official lenders remained willing to 
expand their lending. 
This rapid expansion of convertible currency 
debt in the 1970s was the result of some factors 
which were specific to Cuba's situation as well as 
to other general factors originating in the func-
tioning of the international economy and having 
similar effects on many developing countries. 
Because these have been analysed elsewhere 
recently (Turits, 1987, pp. 164-167) they can be 
summarized quickly here. 
Cuba emerged in the early 1970s from what 
might be considered as a period of economic 
irrationality in the 1960s, characterized by excès-
I 
The buildup of the convertible currency 
debt in the 1970s 
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sive centralization in economic organization, 
excessive and/or premature reliance upon 
"moral incentives" accompanied by a counter-
productive de-emphasis upon material incen-
tives, and excessive concentration on sugar 
production which in effect sacrificed other sec-
tors in order to attain the 10 million ton target 
(Ritter, 1974). By the early 1970s, a concerted 
effort was made to reorchestrate the functioning 
of the economy on the basis of more "rational" 
economic criteria. Not surprisingly, economic 
performance in terms of growth improved: 
cumulative per capita GDP increased by a total of 
64.5% from 1972 to 1978, while it may have 
declined by as much as a total of 9- 5 % from 1964 
to 1972, according to estimations by Brundenius 
(1984, p. 40). (This rapid growth was also a 
partial result of some years of very high world 
"free market" sugar prices in 1974-1976.) In 
view of the new orientation of economic organi-
zation, strategy and policy, together with the 
strong growth performance it was generating, 
Cuba became an attractive borrower from the 
perspective of commercial banks and bilateral 
official lenders. 
At the same time as Cuba's credit-
worthiness underwent dramatic improvement, 
the commercial banks of the market economies, 
flush with petrodollars for relending by 1974, 
began to market their loans aggressively to 
middle-income developing countries. Cuba was 
included as a good creditor in this drive to "recy-
cle petrodollars". Official bilateral lenders were 
also anxious to expand their loans to Cuba to 
finance Cuba's imports of machinery and equip-
ment, especially in periods of slack activity in 
their own national capital goods industries. 
Meanwhile, Cuba's planners had become sig-
nificantly more ambitious in their investment 
programming following the rapid recuperation 
of the Cuban economy in 1972 and 1973 after the 
problems of the late 1960s. Gross investment 
rose from 12.1% of Gross Social Product in 1970 
to 17.2% in 1974, increasing from 668.5 million 
current Cu$ in 1970 to 1 644.8 million Cu$ in 
1974 (NBC, 1975, p. 24). As has occurred in 
Table 1 
CUBA: TOTAL DISBURSED DEBT IN CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY AND 
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Source: Equipo de Investigaciones sobre Economía Cubana, 1985, p. 55, for 1969 and 1975 debt totals; other figures are taken or calculated 
from information in tables 2 and 3. 
""Debt service" is defined asi) interest and ii) interest plus principal as a percentage of total exports of goods and services in the convertible 
currency area. 
The total debt figures in current Cuban pesos are translated into current U.S. dollars using the official exchange rates from table 7. 
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many countries facing short-lived commodity 
price booms, it seems to have been difficult to 
phase down investment and import plans 
quickly enough after a commodity price decline. 
This is due perhaps to expectations that com-
modity prices have ratcheted up to a new level, 
and to the lagged momentum of actual imports 
vis-a-vts the decision to proceed with specific 
investment projects. Furthermore, there was a 
strong inclination on the part of the Cubans to 
diversify -and perhaps to improve the importa-
tion of technology embedded in capital goods by 
increasing imports of these from the market 
economies (Turits, 1987, pp. 165-166). 
The expansion of convertible currency lend-
ing to Cuba in the 1970s was probably a signifi-
cant factor contributing to the impressive 
growth of the Cuban economy in that decade 
because it permitted the importation of capital 
goods from the market economies. By 1978 and 
1979, the debt service burden had built up to 
In the first half of the 1980s, Cuba's convertible 
currency debt problem appeared to be under 
control. The total value of the debt actually 
declined from 1979 to 1982, and when difficul-
ties emerged from 1982 to 1985, negotiations 
with creditors led to successful reschedulings. 
Economic growth was buoyant from 1980 to 
1985, averaging 7.3% per year (see table 7) des-
pite the problems created by servicing the debt 
under harsh (convertible currency) balance-of-
payments circumstances. The underlying debt 
and balance-of-payments situation was not 
really improving, however. 
1. The evolving debt/balance-of-
payments situation 
In 1980 and 1981, the debt situation vis-a-vis the 
balance of payments presented little difficulty. 
The capital and current accounts, each taken 
high levels —about 58% and 45% of export 
income respectively, if both interest and princi-
pal are included in the debt service concept (see 
table 1). However, with a renewed sugar price 
boom on the world free market in 1980 and 1981 
(28.7 US cents and 17.0 US cents per lb. respec-
tively, International Sugar Agreement quote, 
annual average), Cuba's convertible currency 
exports recovered and reached record levels. 
This resulted in a major reduction in the debt 
service burden, despite higher interest rates. 
This sugar price boom, in effect, outweighed and 
camouflaged the steadily deteriorating debt 
burden in terms of rising interest payments and 
amortization from 1978 to 1981 (see table 1). 
By 1979, the convertible currency debt was 
composed principally of commercial bank loans 
(59.8%) and official export credits (31.3%). 
Suppliers' credits —on onerous terms— and 
development assistance credits —usually on easy 
terms— were relatively insignificant. 
separately, were in balance to a surprising 
degree; the imbalances that existed offset each 
other, so that there was virtually no change in 
convertible currency reserves in either year (see 
table 2). In both these years buoyant service 
exports (mainly tourism) and sugar sales coun-
terbalanced imports and interest payments. On 
capital account, net repayments of long-term 
capital were close to net inflows of short-term 
capital. Already the payments problem of the 
1980s had begun, however, because this pay-
ments balance depended upon export earnings 
which were unsustainably high as a result of 
abnormally good "free market" sugar prices in 
those years. 
Cuba's convertible currency debt/balance-
of-payments problem became severe in 1982. 
The immediate cause of the crisis in that year 
was the reduction of short-term loans and depos-
its, which declined by Cu$578 million between 
II 
The debt situation, 1980-1985: manageable 
but deteriorating 
Table 2 
CUBA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY, 1978-1987 
(Millions of current pesos) 
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+14 -1.5 -242.2 +189.1 -105.6 +48.1 -143.8 +13.2 
Source: Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico. Havana, May 1987, for 1985-1986; Banco Nacional de Cuba/Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Cuba: Informe económico trimestral. 
Havana, September 1987, for 1987; Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico, Havana, March 1986, for 1984; Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico, Havana, February 
1985; Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico, Havana, March 1984, for 1982; Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico, Havana, August 1982; Equipo, 1985; ECLAC^Notas 
para el estudio económico de América Latina 1982: Cuba (E/CEPAL/MEX/1983/L.22/Rev. 1 ), Mexico City, October 1983, p. 40, for 1978-1981; Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 









CUBA'S CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY DEBT PROBLEM / A.R.M. Ritter 123 
December 1979 and August 1982 (BNC, 1986c, 
p. 5). This reduction in Cuba's convertible cur-
rency liquidity occurred for no obvious reason 
and was without economic justification in the 
view of the National Bank, because Cuba had 
been honouring its financial commitments 
(BNC, ibid.). This heavy short-term capital out-
flow resulted in a large capital account deficit 
which could not be fully covered by the current 
account surplus of that year. While the appar-
ently artificial net outflow of short-term capital 
looked suspiciously as if it had had political orig-
ins, there is little doubt that other lending in 
1981-1982 was obstructed and cancelled due to 
actions of the United States, which was tighten-
ing the financial element of its embargo on Cuba 
(EIU, 1981,2; 1981,3). Compounding the diffi-
culties were a decline in sugar export earnings 
(offset to some extent by increased petroleum 
reexports and other exports) and very high 
interest rates in 1982. 
Largely as a result of the decline m short-
term bank loans and deposits, Cuba sought a debt 
rescheduling with its convertible currency credi-
tors. Cuba's initial proposals, summarized in 
table 6, called for a multiyear rescheduling of all 
long-term debt maturities falling due in 1982-
1985, including both official and commercial 
bank creditors. A 10-year repayment period was 
proposed, including an initial three-year grace 
period. Short-term bank loans were not included 
in the rescheduling on the assumption that such 
facilities would not be withdrawn at short notice. 
Cuba also offered to assume a number of other 
commitments in its proposal: 
— to restrict and if necessary to sacrifice overall 
economic growth in order to increase con-
vertible foreign-exchange-earning exports 
and to guarantee essential consumption and 
medical attention for the population; 
— to emphasize productive investment for 
import-substitution purposes; 
— to continue the diversification of Cuba's 
international economic relations with deve-
loped market economy countries (DMEs) 
and less-developed countries LDCs); 
— to promote the exportation of services such 
as construction. 
The agreements reached with official and 
commercial bank creditors differed from the 
Cuban proposal mainly in that they covered only 
long-term debt maturing from September 1982 
to December 1983, whereas Cuba had proposed 
that the debt maturities for the whole 1982-1985 
period be included. This meant that the amount 
rescheduled was small compared to Cuba's 
request. It also meant that if external factors did 
not improve, further reschedulings would be 
necessary. This eventuality was anticipated and a 
"Good Will" clause was included in the agree-
ments to facilitate renewed negotiations and 
rescheduling. 
In 1983 and early 1984, Cuba's balance of 
payments and debt performance continued to be 
impaired by a number of circumstances in the 
international economy. These prompted Cuba to 
avail itself of the "Good Will" clause and to seek 
the rescheduling of the long-term debt maturing 
in 1984. Among these circumstances were the 
following: 
— due mainly to climatic factors, sugar produc-
tion fell, and due to priority sales to non-
convertible currency markets, less was 
available for export for convertible currency 
(1.34 million metric tons) (BNC, 1984b, 
p. 16). With sugar prices more or less 
unchanged, earnings fell by Cu$385 million; 
— interest rates continued to be relatively high, 
so that relief on this item was reduced; 
— net repayments of short-term capital were 
rather high. 
However, the payments situation seemed 
relatively healthy in 1983. Convertible currency 
exports of goods and services remained stronger 
than one would have expected in the light of 
sugar prices, and the current account surplus 
exceeded the capital account deficit, so that inter-
national monetary reserves increased byCu$189 
million. Cuba also maintained a growth rate in 
real terms of 4.9% in 1983 despite the reduction 
in sugar production. 
In the 1984 negotiations, Cuba sought and 
obtained some improvement in rescheduling 
conditions (see table 6) so as to be on a par with 
the general 1983/1984 rescheduling terms avail-
able for the rest of Latin America (ECLAC, 1985, 
p. 19). 
Cuba again sought debt rescheduling in 1985 
under the "Good Will" clause, even though the 
balance-of-payments situation in 1984 was rea-
sonably solid and the Gross Social Product grew 
by 7.2% (real) that year. Although sugar prices 
Table 3 
CUBA: FOREIGN D E B T I N CONVERTIBLE C U R R E N C Y 
(Millions of current pesos) 
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total disbursed debt 
Official bilateral 
Intergovernmental loans 
Credits for development assistance 
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Source: Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico. Havana, March 
1986; Banco Nacional de Cuba/State Statistical Committee, 
1986, annex No. 6 for 1979-1984; Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico. Havana, May 1987, p. 43 for 1985-
Cuba: Informe económico trimestral. Havana, September 1987, for 1987. 
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fell to very low levels on the "free market" (5.2 
U.S. cents per lb., International Sugar Agree-
ment (ISA) quote), increased exports for con-
vertible currency helped maintain foreign 
exchange earnings. Merchandise imports were 
permitted to rise by some 34%, however, so that 
the trade surplus fell short of the services deficit, 
resulting in a current account deficit, and thence 
an overall payments deficit and reserve run-
down. The rescheduling sought by Cuba was 
reasonably routine (see table 6). Of particular 
note, however, were two requests. The first of 
these was for reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers by major developed market economy 
creditor countries, in order to promote the diver-
sification and expansion of Cuba's exports of 
non-sugar commodities. The second request was 
for the creation of a US$60 million fund, with 
half paid by Cuba and the other half by creditor 
countries, to finance 120 studies designed to ana-
lyse the feasibility of Cuba's exporting a variety 
of non-traditional exports, including sport 
items, steam boilers, jewellery and flowers to the 
creditor countries. The agreement reached with 
creditors was not particularly notable, and again 
the terms were in about the middle of the range 
obtained by other Latin American countries that 
year (ECLAC, 1985, p. 19). Moreover, only a 
small proportion of the total debt was covered. 
As can be seen in table 2 and 3, the balance of 
payments and debt situation deteriorated 
sharply in 1985. Although exports rose some-
what compared to 1984, they were still 
depressed owing to the very low free market 
sugar price, which averaged 4.06 U.S. cents per 
lb. Higher petroleum reexporters and a strong 
expansion in other exports largely offset the low 
sugar prices, however. The current account was 
in serious deficit by over half a billion Cuban 
pesos, due to the deficit on services. The latter 
occurred despite generally falling world interest 
rates: unfortunately Cuba could not take advan-
tage of these, because it was forced by the 
unavailability of lower-interest short-term bank 
credit to resort to higher-cost suppliers' credits. 
Of even greater importance was the apprecia-
tion of the currencies (mainly the DM, Swiss 
franc and the yen) in which Cuba's debt was held, 
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the Cuban peso. The 
BNC estimated that the appreciation of the real 
value of Cuba's debt, together with the impact of 
rigid interest rates, cost an additional Cu$582.0 
million in 1985. This caused the "Imports of 
Services" item in the 1985 balance of payments 
to rise to an unprecedented level. Surprisingly, 
the huge current account deficit was more than 
offset by increases in short- and long-term net 
capital inflows. For this reason, in 1985 total 
debt increased sharply (by 21%). Its composi-
tion had deteriorated (suppliers' credits had 
grown 16-fold since 1980, while export credits 
with government guarantee had increased by 
58% since that year) and short-term bank dep-
osits plus credits for current imports increased 
from their 1984 levels. 
A significant proportion of the disbursed 
debt in this period was owed to developing coun-
try creditors. In 1983, for example, 33.8% was 
owed to OPEC and other LDCs, with Argentina 
as a major creditor (7.5% of the total debt). Of 
the undisbursed debt, 26.3% was committed to 
Cuba by other developing countries (BNC, 
1984b, pp. 14-15). The major creditors among 
the developed market economies in 1983 were 
Spain (with 13-3% of total outstanding dis-
bursed debt); France (12.1%); Japan (11.3%), 
and the United Kingdom (7.5%). Cuba must be 
somewhat unique among non-Arab Third 
World debtor countries in that about one-third 
of its debt is owed to other developing countries. 
2. Underlying strengths and weaknesses of 
the convertible currency 
balance of payments 
During the whole of the 1980-1985 period, there 
were certain strengths in the evolution of some 
components of the convertible currency balance 
of payments, but also certain weaknesses. The 
latter ultimately overwhelmed the former by 
1985-1986. Among the improvements in the 
balance of payments was an expansion of "other 
exports" (with the exception of 1984, when 
drought and continuing problems with plant 
diseases reduced coffee as well as tobacco produc-
tion). This expansion of "other exports" 
occurred despite continuing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in most of the major convertible cur-
rency markets; despite the intensification in 
August 1983 of problems in marketing nickel 
owing to the tightening of the U.S. secondary 
embargo which prohibited the importation into 
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that country of any products including Cuban 
nickel; and despite the decline of export markets 
in other LDCs, whose foreign exchange earnings 
had been reduced due to the recession of the 
1980s and diverted to servicing their debts. Ser-
vice exports in the 1980s were strong, at least in 
comparison with the 1970s, largely due to 
increased tourism. However, the growth rate of 
such exports in the 1980 to 1985 period was 
uneven and not dramatic (4.4% per annum). 
Sugar exports constituted the major prob-
lem in Cuba's convertible currency balance of 
payments. Sugar prices in the world "free 
market", always unstable, fell sharply from 1980 
to 1985, and hard currency earnings from sugar 
exports dropped by 80% in this period (see 
table 2). The world free market for sugar is pos-
sibly the most pathological and indeed perni-
cious of international commodity markets and 
serves the interests of exporters badly. The 
pathology of the sugar market arises from the 
fact that major blocs of sugar importers and 
exporters —including the European Community 
and ex-Colonies in the "ACP" (Africa, Caribbean 
and Pacific) grouping, the United States and 
favoured suppliers in the Caribbean, and the 
USSR vis-a-vis Cuba— have tried to stabilize and 
insulate their own sugar trading relationships at 
relatively high prices. This has meant that 
supply shortfalls or surpluses within these 
groupings lead to net purchases or sales on the 
marginal world "free market" which in conse-
quence is remarkably unstable. More serious, 
high prices in the internal U.S. and EEC markets 
have discouraged consumption (which for this 
and other reasons has been declining), encour-
aged the production of other sweeteners (artifi-
cial and corn-based), and promoted high-cost 
domestic sugar production. In the European 
Community, other forms of subsidization have 
also stimulated domestic production. As a result 
of the pricing and subsidization of sugar produc-
tion in the European Community, the latter has 
switched from being a major net importer before 
1977 (importing 2.28 million metric tons on 
average in 1974 and 1975) to becoming a major 
net exporter (over 3 million tons annually from 
1981 to 1983) (UNCTAD, 1987; tables 2.9.1 to 
2.9-6). This volume of net exports has helped 
saturate the world "free market", pushing prices 
to low levels from 1982 to 1988. With little 
prospect of a change in the pricing and subsidi-
zation policies within these major sugar produ-
cing/consuming blocs, it is likely that the 
marginal "free market" will continue to be well-
supplied, so that prices are unlikely to show an 
upward trend in the medium-term future 
—although periodic crop shortfalls and sur-
pluses will continue to generate instability. 
Cubans have every right to conclude that the 
world "free market" has not worked for them, 
but it should also be noted that the insulation of 
the USSR-Cuba sugar trade contributes to the 
instability of the residual "free market". 
One item of particular interest in Cuba's 
imports from 1982 to 1985 was the importation 
of sugar, using convertible currency. These sugar 
imports, purchased at the "free market" price, 
were then reexported in order to fulfill long-
term contracts with the Soviet Union (BNC, 
1985, p. 35; EIU, 1983:4). By purchasing at the 
free market price and selling at the FOB price to 
the Soviet Union, Cuba made a profit of around 
750 to 900 Cuban pesos per metric ton in 1984 
and 1985, and a total profit of around 750 and 
1 300 million Cuban pesos in the same years. 
Therefore, while the sugar import item repre-
sents a "weakening" of the convertible currency 
merchandise trade balance in these years, in fact 
it permitted major gains on the inconvertible 
currency trade balance (see the annex for the 
calculations on which these estimates are based.) 
These estimates are in nominal pesos at official 
US$/Cu$ conversion rates, and represent an 
upper limit on Cuban profits. Because the nomi-
nal exchange rate is unrealistic, and because rou-
ble earnings must be spent on imports from the 
USSR or other CMEA countries (whose mer-
chandise exports often are uncompetitive in 
terms of price and quality), the sugar reexport 
profit estimates are probably excessive. It 
remains to be seen how long the USSR and other 
CMEA countries generously allow Cuba to make 
middleman profits of this sort. 
The most dynamic component of Cuba's 
convertible currency export performance was 
the reexportation of petroleum. Petroleum reex-
ports made up 10.8% of total convertible cur-
rency exports in 1981, rising to 42.3% in 1985. 
Petroleum "reexports" are permitted by the 
Soviet Union on the basis of an agreement which 
provided that if petroleum consumption and 
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importation were below previously planned lev-
els as a result of conservation measures and in 
relation to import levels from the Soviet Union, 
the petroleum which was "saved" could be "reex-
ported" at world prices and in convertible cur-
rency. Interestingly enough, the sole importers 
in 1983 were other socialist countries 
—presumably the European neighbours of the 
USSR (BNC, 1984b, p. 3). This did not mean that 
petroleum was physically transported back to 
Eastern Europe. Instead, the transaction was in 
accounting terms only, with the petroleum 
shipped directly to the importing country. Cuba 
was quite successful in reducing petroleum con-
sumption, particularly through the completion 
of energy systems in the sugar mills which 
burned bagasse rather than petroleum products. 
Major efforts were also made to induce fuel con-
servation throughout the economy by incentive 
systems to reward enterprises which successfully 
reduced consumption (in the form of wage 
bonuses) and to penalize enterprises which con-
sumed too much (EIU, 1982:1, p.8), and by var-
ious investments to improve the efficiency of 
energy use in major petroleum-consuming activ-
ities such as nickel mining and thermal electric-
ity generation. Domestic extraction of 
petroleum also increased significantly in these 
years. 
Under this petroleum reexport scheme, 
Cuba was able to obtain significant profits, 
which were perhaps around Cu$105 million in 
In 1986, convertible currency exports slumped, 
the Balance-of-payments position worsened, and 
the debt problem intensified. Cuba responded by 
suspending payment on the debt on 1 July and 
proposing a major multiyear rescheduling. It 
also implemented a set of policies designed to 
reduce imports through austerity, to promote 
efficiency by the "rectification" programme, and 
to continue to increase hard currency foreign 
exchange earnings. The result of the import 
shortage and the austerity measures was a 
1983 and Cu$20 million in 1984 (see annex table 
for the estimates). These profits (measured in 
pesos, but earned in hard currency) are undoubt-
edly greatly underestimated, because the conver-
sion rate used for the Cuban peso vis-a-vis the 
U.S. dollar is the official rate, which is very much 
overvalued. 
The convertible currency foreign exchange 
earnings accruing to Cuba under this scheme 
obviously strengthened the convertible currency 
export performance. But while real resources 
were undoubtedly transferred to Cuba through 
this device, reliance upon such an artificial arran-
gement is dangerous, first because world petro-
leum prices could decline —as they did in 1986— 
thereby reducing or eliminating such arbitrage 
profits, and second, because the arrangement 
could be changed by the donor country. 
Cuba's external situation in 1985 ended in 
paradox. Despite the small surplus in the con-
vertible currency balance of payments, the trade 
deficits for both the socialist and the market 
economies reached record levels, totalling 
Cu$2 000 million (see table 7). The convertible 
currency debt had thus increased by 17% and its 
composition had worsened, although economic 
growth remained reasonably high and invest-
ment levels reached 15.8% of the global social 
product. However, strong economic growth per-
formance was no longer sustainable in view of 
the severe external disequilibria. 
decline in overall economic growth performance 
in 1986 and 1987, a reduction in investment 
levels as maintenance of basic consumption lev-
els was given priority, and reductions in 
productivity. 
1. The size of the convertible 
currency debt 
By 1986, Cuba's convertible currency debt situa-
tion bore some resemblance to that of the rest of 
HI 
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Latin America, although it was still not as bur-
densome as for other major debtors, and there 
were also some major differences. Some of the 
main indicators of Cuba's "debt burden" in rela-
tion to other Latin American countries are sum-
marized in table 4. It can be seen that Cuba's 
total debt was eighth highest in the region in 
1987. In per capita terms, Cuba's convertible 
currency debt in 1986 was lighter than for the 
main problem debtor countries, but when the 
debt with the Soviet Union was included, Cuba's 
per capita debt exceeded the Latin American 
average significantly. With respect to debt ser-
vice (interest only) on convertible currency debt, 
Table 4 
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Source: 1. HCLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy, 1987 (LC/G. 1485), Santiago, Chile, December 1987, p. 25, for all 
information except for Cuba. 
2. Banco Nacional de Cuba <BNC), Informe económico, Havana, May 1987, for Cuban data. 
3. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Cuba, ¡987-1988, London, 1987, p. 25, 
4. World Bank, World Development Report, 1987. New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 202-203 for population 
estimates. 
"Totals for desbursed debt of Latin American countries are preliminary estimates by ECLAC. 
For the estimates of Cuba's total debts with the USSR as a percentage of "goods and services exports", only merchandise exports are 
included, information on trade in services being unavailable. 
'Cuba's debts with other countries in Eastern Europe are excluded, so that the "Totals" for Cuba's debt indicators are underestimated. 
The exchange rate used for converting Cuba's peso debt to U.S. dollars is Cu$1.00 = US$0.73, that is, the average official exchange rate 
for 1987. 
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Source: Table 2; Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico, Havana, March 1986; EC1.AC, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American 
Economy, 19X7 (LC/G.1485), Santiago, Chile, December 1987, p. 23. 
"Disbursements are "net" for 1983 and 1984, i.e., amortization payments are deducted. 
Cuba's situation was difficult, but less so than in 
the case of most other countries. Total debt ser-
vice, including the zero interest payments on the 
debt with the Soviet Union, was light compared 
to the other countries. On the other hand, Cuba's 
total hard currency debt as a percentage of hard 
currency exports (322%) was higher than the 
ratios for about half the other countries, but still 
below the average for the whole region (416%). 
A final point might be made concerning Cuba's 
convertible currency debt situation. From 1980 
to 1986, net financial outflows in convertible 
currency totalled Cu$l 261 million (see table 5). 
This net outflow is small relative to the net 
outflows of resources (net inflows of capital less 
net payments of interest and profits) for all of 
Latin America in the same period, which totalled 
US$108.2 billion (ECLAC, 1987, p. 23). Never-
theless, Cuba's position in this respect was basi-
cally similar to that of the rest of Latin America. 
In sum, while Cuba was not a "big league" 
debtor like Brazil, Mexico or Argentina, it was 
no longer in the same unique and favoured situa-
tion in which it had considered itself to be 
earlier. 
2. Causal factors 
The immediate source of Cuba's 1986 difficulties 
was the decline in the world price of petroleum, 
which fell by more than half in three months, 
from US$26.60 in December 1985 to US$13.20 
by March 1986. This reduced the hard currency 
value of Cuba's petroleum reexports by almost 
Cu$280 million, or by more than half, from 1985 
to 1986. The situation was aggravated by the 
drought which reduced the 1985-1986 sugar 
harvest and lowered 1986 sugar exports so that 
Cuba was unable to capitalize on the improve-
ment in "free market" sugar prices (from 4 U.S. 
cents in 1985 to 6 cents in 1986, average Interna-
tional Sugar Agreement quote). Moreover 
Cuba's other exports declined by Cu$100 million 
due to a variety of factors including drought, 
Hurricane "Kate" and low international com-
modity prices. For all of these reasons, Cuba's 
hard currency exports fell by Cu$337 million in 
1986. An attempt was made to cut hard currency 
imports in line with exports, but this was diffi-
cult because they had already been reduced to 
about 70% of the country's estimated require-
ments, and a proportion of imports had already 
been contracted for (BNC, 1986b, pp. 11-12). 
As a result of this rapidly deteriorating situa-
tion, officials of the National Bank (BNC) 
decided that circumstances necessitated a new 
rescheduling of the convertible currency debt on 
a broader basis than those of the previous three 
years. Cuba's proposals, summarized in table 6, 
called for rescheduling virtually all medium and 
long-term debt service commitments to official 
creditors and commercial banks (including inter-
est as well as amortization) which were to fall 
due in 1986 and 1987. This amounted to about 
Cu$960 million (BNC, 1986b, p. 20). A repay-
ment period of 12 years was requested, with a 
six-year grace period. Fresh funds amounting to 
Cu$430 million were requested for general 
balance-of-payments support. The rationale for 
this request was that external factors —nine in 
all— beyond Cuba's control had caused the hard 
currency losses. These factors included continu-
Table 6 
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1982-1983 negotiations 1984 negotiations 
Official creditors 
(Paris Club) 
Proportion of debt maturities 




Proportion of debt maturities 






N e w lending request 















(1 March 1983) 
9 5 % (Sept. 1982 to 
Dec. 1983 maturities) 
3 years, 10 months 
8 years, 4 months 
(30 D e c , 1983) 
100% (Sept. 1982 to 
Dec. 1983 maturities) 
3 years, 4 months 
7 years, 10 months 
Cuba's position 
(March 1984) 
100% (1984 maturities) 
5 years 
10 years, 6 months 
100% (1984 maturities) 
5 years 
10 years, 6 months 
Agreement 
(19 July 1984) 
9 5 % (1984 maturities) 
5 years, 6 months 
9 years, 6 months 
(13 D e c , 1984) 
100% (1984 maturities) 
5 years, 7 months 
9 years, 6 months 
36% of total debt 
CuSl 057.3 million 
Short-term bank loans to 
be rolled over 
Commitment to promote 
exports, diversify trade 
ties, emphasize economic 
efficiency 
LIBOR + 2.25% 
1.25% 
0 
5 3 % of debt service 
Renewal till Sept. 1984 




11.4% of total debt 
Cu$3l7 million 
Confirmation of existing 
short- term credit levels 
(Cu$800 million) by banks 
LIBOR + 1 . 8 8 % 
0.88% 
0 
4 0 % of debt service 











Table 6 (concluded) 
1985 negotiations 1986 negotiations 
Official creditors 
(Paris Club) 
Proportion of debt maturities 




Proport ion of debt maturities 






N e w lending request 




100% (1985 maturities) 
L.A.m. average 
L.A.IX1. average 




(18 July 1985) 
9 5 % (1985 maturities) 
6 years, 6 months 
10 years, 6 months 
(16 Sept., 1985) 
100% (1985 maturities) 
6 years, 8 months 
10 years, 8 months 











( I 6 j u l y 1986) 
100% (principal + interest 
'82+'83 debt due in 1980) 
6 years 
10 years, 6 months 
N o agreement with 
bank creditors 




7.7% of total debt 
LIBOR + 1.5% 
0.38% 
0 
2 9 % of debt services 
Agreement by creditor nations N o action 
to lower tariffs and NTBs 
and promote expansion 
and diversification of trade 
Roll over of short-term bank 
loans granted before 
1 Sept. 1982 
Renewal till Sept. 1986 
N o change proposed 
N o change proposed 
Cu$430 millón balance-
of-payments support 
All medium and long-term 
debt service, 1986-1987: 
Cu$96l million 
Postpone 1986-1987 
interest to 1992 
Debt service suspended, 
1 July 1986 
pending agreement 
Source: Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC), informe económico, Havana, August 1982, March 1984 and February 1985; Banco Nacional de Cuba, Cuba: deuda externa y su proceso de 
renegociacián, Havana, December 1986; J.L. Rodriguez, "EI desarrollo en Cuba en el contexto de la crisis económica latinoamericana de los años 80", Temas de economía mundial. 
Retista del CiliM, No. 17, Havana, 1987; EŒAC, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy, 1985 (LC/G.1383), Santiago, Chile, December 1985. 
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ing low sugar prices, low oil prices, continuing 
protectionism on the part of the developed 
market economies, Hurricane "Kate", drought 
etc. (BNC, 1986b, pp. 16-18). 
Agreement was reached with the Paris Club 
of official creditors by 16 July 1986, but could not 
be achieved with the commercial banks. The 
agreement with the Paris Club covered a smaller 
volume of debt than Cuba had proposed initially. 
Only that debt existing in 1982 or renegotiated 
in 1983 and falling due in 1986 was to be resche-
duled, rather than all 1986 and 1987 maturities. 
The Paris Club creditors did provide about 75 
million pesos of fresh funds, but this was far 
short of the amount requested (EIU, 1987:4, 
p. 11). The repayment conditions were close to 
Cuba's initial request. Because of the failure to 
obtain a multiyear rescheduling, new negotia-
tions were requested for 1987. 
The rescheduling of commercial bank debt 
failed because the banks' proposals fell far short 
of Cuba's requests, and compromise was not 
achieved. The banks offered fresh funds amount-
ing to DM 150-170 million (57-65 million pesos) 
(BNC, 1986c, p. 12) in comparison with the 430 
million peso initial request. These fresh funds 
were to be linked to interest payments, and 
amounted to an interest capitalization scheme. 
The banks proposed to reschedule only the 1986 
maturities of the debt in effect in 1982 (for 10 
years with a six-year grace period), plus a two-
year rescheduling of the 1986 maturities of that 
debt renegotiated in 1983- When these differen-
ces could not be resolved, Cuba suspended pay-
ment on both principal and interest. 
3. The policy response and results 
By early 1986, it was clear that the overall con-
vertible currency payments imbalance was 
neither sustainable nor renegotiable and that a 
strong adjustment programme to deal with the 
convertible currency debt problem was neces-
sary. The policies adopted in 1986 could be categ-
orized under the labels "austeri ty", 
"rectification" and "restructuring for hard-
currency conservation". 
A detailed "austerity" policy package was 
presented and adopted in December 1986 at the 
National Assembly of People's Power. It was 
intended to be a complement to the Develop-
ment Plan and Budget for 1987. The austerity 
programme included a variety of elements 
designed to increase exports or reduce consump-
tion of certain hard currency import-intensive 
commodities (BNC, 1986c, pp. 15-16): 
— monthly import quotas of kerosene (used 
mainly for cooking) were to be cut in order 
to reduce convertible currency imports by 
35 000 metric tons (or 256 550 barrels); 
— 10 000 000 m2 of textiles were to be diverted 
from domestic consumption and made avail-
able for export; 
— domestic sugar consumption quotas were to 
be reduced in order to increase exports; 
— television programming was to be reduced 
by 29 hours per week to save oil (used for 
thermal generation of electricity) in order to 
make 130 000 barrels of petroleum available 
for reexport; 
— electric power rates were to be raised to 
reduce oil consumption and increase 
reexports; 
— gasoline allocations for State administrative 
activities were to be reduced by 20% to per-
mit more oil reexports; 
— food quotas were to be reviewed and 
reduced, and allocations of imported food-
stuffs to workers' dining rooms and day-care 
centres were to be cut. 
Other items included increases in some retail 
prices, especially on the "parallel market", and 
higher interurban bus fares. Perhaps the most 
important part of the policy package was the 
proposal to limit hard currency imports to 
Cu$600-700 million per year (far below the 
Cu$1.3 billion hard currency import levels which 
the Cubans considered necessary). The growth 
rate of the economy was also to be limited to 
between 1.5 and 2.0% for 1987 (BNC, 1986c, 
p. 15). This constituted a set of self-imposed 
measures, as drastic as those of the IMF, aimed 
particularly at the convertible currency problem 
but also designed to improve internal finances. 
To moderate the impact of these measures on 
income distribution, the minimum monthly 
wage was increased from 85 to 100 pesos per 
month, and incomes at the bottom end of the 
wage scale were raised, affecting perhaps 
180 000 workers. Pensions were also increased 
to 100 pesos per month, affecting perhaps 
350 000 persons (EIU, 1987:1, p. 10). At the 
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same time, the official perquisites of higher-
level bureaucrats, such as access to State vehicles, 
were cut back, and such individuals were 
required to buy the vehicles and cover their run-
ning costs. Similarly domestic "per diems" and 
hard currency foreign travel allowances were 
reduced. The reconsideration of work norms and 
salary scales under the "rectification" pro-
gramme was also designed to reduce anomalous 
inequalities and injustices. 
It is also likely that the "rectification" pro-
gramme begun at the February 1986 Third Party 
Congress was inspired at least in part by the 
difficulties arising from the debt/balance-of-
payments problem. This programme, intended 
to "correct errors" in the administration of the 
socialist economy but not to change its basic 
orientation, has emphasized i) the rationaliza-
tion of work norms, wage and salary scales, 
bonus payment schemes and perquisite arrange-
ments; ii) the eradication of certain corrupt 
practices such as in the procurement of building 
materials for private house construction; iii) the 
elimination of certain —but not all— private 
sector activities, notably the farmers' markets, in 
an effort to reduce the accrual of large incomes 
by middlemen and large farmers, with visibly 
demoralizing effects on other workers; iv) the 
austerity measures mentioned previously. Per-
haps one of the most important results of the 
"rectification" programme, however, is the 
highly critical attitude which seems to prevail in 
evaluation and self-evaluation at the numerous 
"Asambleas del Balance del PCC" (meetings of 
the Cuban Communist Party for performance 
evaluation) held at various levels from enter-
prise to Ministry, and at other meetings of Min-
istry directors (see, for example, Oranma, 
9 February 1988, which describes a session of the 
annual meeting of directors of the Ministry of 
Basic Industry). This reawakened critical atti-
tude should prove useful in making the current 
economic administration operate more effi-
ciently (although it will not help solve systemic 
difficulties such as the lack of a single realistic 
exchange rate, the existence of which would per-
mit export and import decisions to be made 
more easily and on the basis of economically 
realistic criteria). 
The third element in Cuba's approach to the 
hard currency debt/balance-of-payments prob-
lem has been to promote» exports of goods and 
services and to try to accelerate the completion 
of major import-substituting investments. For 
example, tourism, which has expanded rapidly 
¡n the 1980s and become a major hard currency 
earner (with 91% of its total earnings of 
Cu$107.6 million in 1986 being in convertible 
currency (BNC, 1987, p. 20)), continues to be a 
high-priority sector and has received substantial 
new investment and critical attention. Major 
efforts have been put into projects to expand 
nickel production, which have been subject to 
delays so far in the 1980s but which should come 
on stream soon. Domestic crude oil extraction 
received considerable emphasis and has 
expanded rapidly, at a rate of 26% per year 
from 1980 to 1985. Recent extraction levels are 
1 million metric tons (7.33 million barrels) per 
year, or approximately 15% of consumption 
(EIU 1987:4, pp. 12-13). Efforts are also being 
made to expand the direct use of local crude oil 
wherever possible, e.g., in power generation and 
cement making (EIU, 1987:2, p. 13). Expansion 
of oil extraction would be of immense value to 
Cuba, and now does not seem to be improbable 
in the light of the geological features of the 
Caribbean basin and preliminary surveys. The 
nuclear plant for the generation of electricity has 
been particularly slow in coming on stream. It 
was expected to do so in late 1985 but is still far 
from completion. When completed, it should 
save some 33% of crude oil imports (EIU, 
1984:4). Emphasis on the speedy completion of 
all these major projects should improve the con-
vertible currency balance-of-payments situation 
by the early 1990s. 
Despite the actions undertaken to improve 
the convertible currency debt/balance-of-
payments situation in 1987, the results seem to 
have been disappointing, although a definitive 
statistical picture is not yet clear. The austerity 
programme which was designed to improve the 
convertible currency foreign exchange situation 
was implemented quickly and effectively in 
1987. Through reduction in imports and 
increases in exports and reexports it generated 
33 million pesos worth of hard currencies in that 
year. It improved the State budget by an esti-
mated Cu$266.3 million, and it improved the 
"balance of income and expenditures" (i.e., it 
reduced net monthly income and relieved the 
134 CEPAL REVIEW No. 36 / December 1988 
pervasive suppressed inflation) by someCu$215 
million (BNC, 1988c). Unfortunately, the hard 
currency impact of the austerity programme was 
small compared with the total value of converti-
ble currency imports and exports, so that it pro-
vided only minimal relief from the debt 
problem. 
Investment was reduced by almost 27% in 
1987 in order to reduce capital goods imports 
from hard currency countries (see table 7). 
Indeed, total investment including inventory 
change fell by 46.6% from 1985 to 1987 (BNC, 
1988c, p. 4). The decline in investment was due 
largely to a reduction in the initiation of new 
projects, while the completion of ongoing pro-
jects was given a high priority. The cutback on 
investment expenditures had a major impact on 
the construction sector, the output of which fell 
by over 11% in 1987 (BNC/CEE, 1987, p. 10). 
The shortage of hard currency foreign 
exchange also led to reduced imports of interme-
diate inputs as well as replacements and spare 
parts. This reduced levels of output in a number 
of areas in 1987, while the climatic disturbances 
of 1985-1987 contributed to the reduction in 
agricultural output in that year. 
As a result of all of these factors —the aus-
terity programme, the investment cutback, 
reduced imported inputs, and the climate— the 
gross social product contracted by 3.5% in 1987, 
or by 4.5% in per capita terms (BNC, 1988c, 
p. 3). At the same time there was a major decline 
in labour productivity (-4.7%). The resulting 
economic contraction was in sharp contrast with 
the positive growth rate of +1.5 to 2.0 which had 
been previously anticipated for 1987. Implemen-
tation of the "rectification" programme was well 
underway in that year, but this programme could 
not be expected to yield significant or measu-
rable results in a period of time as short as 
18 months. 
The convertible currency balance of pay-
ments showed some improvement in 1987, with 
preliminary estimates indicating that exports 
rose to Cu$990 million, an amount exceeding 
that for 1986 but below that for 1985 (BNC, 
January 1988a, p. 1.). The 9% increase vis-à-vis 
1986 was due to some recuperation of sugar and 
petroleum prices and a 9% increase in non-sugar 
exports, while imports from hard currency areas 
declined somewhat. The deficit in the services 
category rose sharply despite a 10% increase in 
hard currency tourism revenues and despite the 
moratorium on interest payments. The main 
reason for the large services deficit, and also the 
large current account deficit, was the fact that an 
allowance of Cu$377 million had to be made for 
the appreciation of creditor countries' currencies 
or "exchange rate adjustment", which enters the 
balance of payments as a negative item under the 
trade in services. On capital account, there was a 
large net inflow of long-term capital, presuma-
bly representing disbursements of previously-
negotiated loans, together with very low 
repayment of loans due to the moratorium. 
Overall, the payments balance is estimated to 
have been slightly positive for 1987 (see table 2), 
but it should be emphasized that this only 
occurred because interest and amortization pay-
ments on the debt had largely ceased. 
On the other hand, the convertible currency 
debt picture worsened sharply in 1987. The total 
peso value of the debt increased by 435% 
between 1986 and 1987, or by Cu$1.68 billion. 
The largest part of this increase occurred as a 
result of the significant devaluation of the Cuban 
peso used for trade and debt accounting purposes 
against all major DME currencies, including the 
U.S. dollar, which was itself depreciating (BNC-
CEE, 1987, p. 29). By devaluing this exchange 
rate from US$0.83 per Cuban peso to US$1.00 
per peso, about 1.1 billion pesos were added to 
the convertible currency debt. There is no evi-
dence that the value of Cuba's hard currency debt 
as denominated in pesos was adjusted in this 
fashion before 1987, and it certainly was not in 
the 1980-1985 period, when the appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar would have led to a corresponding 
downward adjustment of the magnitude of the 
debt (as may be seen from table 1). Unfortu-
nately, details on the methodology and specific 
rationale for tying the value of the peso-
denominated debt to the value of the U.S. dollar 
are not available. • 
By the beginning of 1988, a large volume of 
debt arrears had been built up due to the morato-
rium, including Cu$2 105 million in principal 
and Cu$356 million in interest (BNC, 1988c, 
p. 3). With Cu$l 212 million in principal and 
Cu$505 million in interest coming due in 1988, 
the total value of debt repayment theoretically 
necessary for 1988 would be Cu$4 178 million, 
Table 7 
CUBA: MAJOR MACROECONOMIC I N D I C A T O R S 
Global social product (real) 
Growth rate (percentage) 
Per capita growth rate (percentage) 
Investment (real) 
Growth rate (percentage) 
As a proportion of GSP (percentage) 
Productivity change" 
Output per worker (percentage) 
Merchandise trade 
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Latin America: Growth rate of per capita 
gross domestic product (percentage) 
(excluding Cuba) 2.8 -1.9 -37 -4.8 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.5 
Source: State Statistical Committee (CEU), Anuario estadístico de Cuba, ¡9B5. Havana, 1986, pp. 100,161,193,381; &NC-CEE,Cuba: Informe económico trimestral. Havana, September 1987, 
p. 11; BNC, Informe económico. Havana, May 1987; ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy, 1987 (LC/G.1485), Santiago, Chile, December 1987; ECLAC, 
Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy. 1985 (LC/G.1383), Santiago, Chile, December 1985-
"Change in gross output per worker, at constant 1981 prices, prices at enterprise, and average workers per year. 
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that is, about 400% of the hard currency foreign 
exchange earnings for 1987. Clearly this is an 
impossible task under any foreseeable balance of 
payments scenarios for 1988. It was in this con-
text that Cuba again approached the Paris Club 
of creditors in January 1988. At these meetings, 
the Government of Cuba requested that virtually 
all official bilateral credits maturing in 1987 and 
1988, together with interest due but not paid 
before 31 December 1988, be rescheduled for 
15 years including a 5-year grace period. By mid-
March 1988, agreement had not been reached. 
4. Prospects and policy options 
Cuba's convertible currency debt and balance-of-
payments situation will be difficult but no hope-
less for the next few years. A major debt 
rescheduling is urgently required in the short 
term. In the longer term, a lasting resolution of 
the current problem will require a more ambi-
tious adjustment or restructuring programme 
than has been considered so far. 
The immediate difficulties in 1988 are 
daunting: 
— foreign trade is of necessity conducted on a 
cash-only basis due to lack of foreign 
exchange and drying up of credit sources; 
— the debt service burden plus arrears for July 
1986 to 1988 is overwhelming, at over 400% 
of annual convertible currency foreign 
exchange earnings; 
— asphyxiation of production due to shortages 
of imported inputs and capital goods from 
hard currency areas will continue to damage 
growth prospects; 
— the lucrative petroleum and sugar reexport 
schemes are vulnerable to changes in toler-
ance of them by the Soviet Union, as well as 
lower prices in the case of petroleum; 
— world "free market" sugar prices are 
unlikely to improve markedly for any length 
of time, unless there are major changes in 
bloc protectionism. 
On the other hand, there are a number of 
factors which should have modestly beneficial 
impacts on the overall and the hard currency 
debt and balance-of-payments situations. These 
include: 
— probable increases in tourism; 
— expansion of nickel concentrate production 
and exports by about 30% in terms of 
volume; 
— probable increases in sugar production 
volumes, provided the weather is not 
inclement; 
— priority investment projects in export activ-
ities (citrus packing houses, fish processing 
facilities, tourist hotel refurbishment, and 
sugar) which should assist export expansion 
in the medium term; 
— prospective increases in petroleum extrac-
tion and refining, which should reduce oil 
imports and/or permit increased reexports; 
— the future start-up of petroleum-saving 
nuclear energy generation. 
Unfortunately these positive factors are of 
limited short-term impact, while Cuba faces an 
immediate liquidity shortage. The positive fac-
tors should be of some benefit in the 1989 to 
1992 period, but in the meantime Cuba must 
obtain hard currency foreign exchange for cur-
rent use. 
A major rescheduling of the hard currency 
debt appears to be unavoidable. Such a resche-
duling would stretch out payments for 1988 
maturities and arrears over a long period of time. 
It would add significantly to the magnitude of 
the debt because 1988 interest and interest 
arrears —some Cu$86l million in total— would 
be "capitalized", that is, covered by increased 
loans. "Interest capitalization" is unfortunate 
but probably necessary. Provision of "fresh 
money" for immediate uses would also be useful. 
A major consolidation of debt in the reschedul-
ing to replace high-cost suppliers' credits with 
lower-cost long-term bank credits would be 
desirable as well. 
Cuba is unwilling to place itself under the 
scrutiny, monitoring, or policing of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund or World Bank (it is not a 
member of either of these agencies) or any other 
such body. On the other hand, the commercial 
banks and the public financial institutions of the 
Paris Club require some assurance that Cuba is 
undertaking internal policy initiatives which 
will permit it to earn hard currency foreign 
exchange and eventually service the debt suc-
cessfully in the long run. This means that Cuba 
itself must design, implement and report on its 
own structural adjustment programme so as to 
satisfy its creditors. Cuba effectively performed 
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all of these functions in the austerity programme 
adopted in December 1986. As noted, that pro-
gramme was well implemented, but the benefits 
it produced were small relative to what was 
needed. A more ambitious structural adjustment 
programme is required. 
Cuba has already adopted some of the fea-
tures of such an adjustment programme, includ-
ing investment projects to expand exports and 
substitute for imports and schemes for reducing 
direct consumption of imported commodities. 
What is now necessary is a major expansion of 
this programme with special attention to 
exports and to the country's convertible currency 
needs. How can Cuba's hard currency export 
earnings and import savings be increased? This 
is a difficult task and one which has preoccupied 
Cuban policy-makers for some years. It is a task 
made more difficult because it requires large 
amounts of what it is supposed to generate, 
namely hard currency. In the medium term, the 
hard currency foreign exchange situation should 
improve as the various export and import-
substituting projects mentioned earlier come on 
stream. In the longer term, export earnings 
(especially in hard currency) will need to be 
further increased if the convertible currency debt 
is to be serviced and worked down and if ade-
quate levels of imports from the DMEs and LDCs 
are to be maintained. In this endeavour, normali-
zation of trade relations with the United States 
would be useful in providing a good market for a 
variety of non-sugar and non-traditional exports 
as well as a major source of tourism. Unfortu-
nately the termination of the U.S. embargo will 
be decided in Washington, not Havana, and its 
timing cannot at present be predicted. 
A number of policies could be adopted by 
Cuba to strengthen its participation in the inter-
national non-CMEA economic system. These 
would include a continued dedication to invest-
ment projects generating or conserving hard 
currency, a new exchange rate policy, and a new 
system of linking enterprises more closely to 
foreign producers in order to improve product 
design and quality from the standpoint of for-
eign purchasers. An exchange rate reform would 
likely involve a major devaluation, together with 
unification of the current multiplicity of 
exchange rates. Improving the linkages of enter-
prises with their foreign markets would involve 
a major decentralization of decision-making 
regarding product design, pricing, input pro-
curement and marketing. If both these types of 
action were taken, this would imply significant 
movement towards decentralization and mar-
ketization. The likelihood of significant move-
ment in these directions can only be the subject 
of speculation at this time, but they may not be 
out of the question. 
In the meantime, if a major rescheduling of 
the hard currency debt with official and commer-
cial bank creditors is not achieved, Cuba faces 
some difficult choices. Unilateral repudiation is 
still unlikely, even though part of the basis for 
President Castro's rejection of this alternative 
for Cuba has changed: Cuba is not and does not 
perceive itself to be in a strong enough economic 
position at this time to service the hard currency 
debt except at unacceptably high cost in terms of 
popular living standards. This being the case, the 
option associated with President Alan Garcia of 
Peru —that is to say, to unilaterally agree to 
service the debt ultimately but at a reduced 
level— would appear to be attractive. In Peru's 
case, the debt service is limited to 10% of foreign 
exchange earnings. A variant of this approach 
might be appropriate for Cuba. Certain other 
devices might also be useful in working down the 
debt, including countertrade arrangements in 
which creditor banks accepted repayment in 
kind, or schemes in which creditor banks agreed 
to purchase additional Cuban exports for hard 
currency when part of the debt was repaid 
(ECLAC, 1987, p. 9). (Debt-for-equity swaps 
probably have virtually no role to play in the 
Cuban case, although the existence of foreign 
investment legislation in Cuba would indicate 
that such swaps may not be impossible.) 
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Exchange rate used 
Cu$/US$ .717 .804 .859 .869 .90 .92 .83 1.00 
Source: Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe económico, Havana, May 1987,p. 25; Comité Estatal de Estadística, República de Cuba, Anuario estadístico de Cuba. 1985, Havana, 1986, p. 409; 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti. No. 4, London, 1986, p. 12; Banco Nacional de Cuba/Comité Estatal de 
Estadísticas, Cuba: Informe económico trimestral, Havana, September 1987. 
Notes: 1. Conversion factors used: I metric ton = 2 204.6 lbs; 1 metric ton of oil = 733 barrels. 
2. The exchange rate used for currency conversions is the official rate "Contra Certificado de Divisas indirecto", the rate used for balance of payments and debt accounting purposes. 
The series indicates devaluation against the U.S. dollar (which was appreciating) from 1980 to 1985, followed by a peso appreciation in 1986. In 1987 there was a major peso 
devaluation against the U.S. dollar despite the fact that the dollar itself was devalued that year. The fact that, at these official exchange rates, large losses on petroleum reexports were 
occurring but that trade was being continued only indicates that the exchange rate is seriously overvalued. With a more realistic exchange rate (e.g., US$ 1 = Cu$2) the impon price of 
sugar would be increased and the reexport profits reduced, while the reexport price of petroleum and hence reexport profits would be increased in terms of Cuban pesos. 
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IV 
Summary and conclusions 
Cuba's convertible currency debt, which 
increased rapidly in the 1970s, was manageable 
without major difficulty from 1980 to 1985, 
albeit with three reschedulings. In retrospect, 
however, the underlying hard currency balance 
of payments was being strengthened somewhat 
artificially by petroleum reexports which were 
ultimately unsustainable. The rapid economic 
growth from 1981 to 1985 was not accompanied 
by sufficient improvements in convertible cur-
rency foreign exchange earnings or savings. In 
early 1986, the seriousness of the underlying 
problem became apparent, as petroleum reex-
ports fell by over half (due to the fall in world oil 
prices) while other non-sugar exports also 
declined. Cuba was unable to service its hard 
currency debt, except at unacceptable cost, and 
therefore declared a moratorium on commercial 
bank debt on 1 July 1986. 
Since 1986, the basic hard currency debt and 
balance-of-payments situation has improved 
very little despite a well-implemented and self-
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imposed austerity programme, despite the com-
mencement of the "rectification" process, and 
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towards foreign exchange-generating or con-
serving projects and towards projects nearing 
completion. Rates of economic growth declined, 
reaching -3-5% in 1987 in comparison with a 
targeted rate of +1.5 to 2.0% for that year. By 
early 1988, the situation was grave, with pay-
ments for 1988 plus arrears amounting to about 
400% of expected hard currency foreign 
exchange earnings, and with major risks of 
further deterioration which appear likely to 
overwhelm some more positive factors in the 
short run. A major rescheduling is urgently 
required, but this had not been achieved by late 
March 1988. In the absence of such a reschedul-
ing, a continuation of a unilateral repayments 
moratorium by Cuba may occur. However, it is 
more likely that Cuba may adopt a "Peruvian-
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debt, but at a level of servicing deemed reasona-
ble in terms of Cuba's ability to pay. 
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